{"id":8509,"date":"2016-02-03T11:08:42","date_gmt":"2016-02-03T11:08:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lab.wrkshp.fi\/huopaniemi\/?p=8509"},"modified":"2018-03-23T17:50:01","modified_gmt":"2018-03-23T15:50:01","slug":"2-8-frag-20-r","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/2-8-frag-20-r\/","title":{"rendered":"2.8 Fragment 20"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1><em>2.8<\/em> Fragment 20<\/h1>\n\n\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#gallery-1 {\n\t\t\t\tmargin: auto;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t#gallery-1 .gallery-item {\n\t\t\t\tfloat: left;\n\t\t\t\tmargin-top: 10px;\n\t\t\t\ttext-align: center;\n\t\t\t\twidth: 100%;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t#gallery-1 img {\n\t\t\t\tborder: 2px solid #cfcfcf;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t#gallery-1 .gallery-caption {\n\t\t\t\tmargin-left: 0;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\/* see gallery_shortcode() in wp-includes\/media.php *\/\n\t\t<\/style><div id=\"gallery-1\" class=\"gallery galleryid-8509 gallery-columns-1 gallery-size-large\"><dl class=\"gallery-item\"><dt class=\"gallery-icon landscape\">\n\t\t\t\t<img width=\"1024\" height=\"640\" src=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20-1024x640.jpg\" class=\"attachment-large size-large\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-1-6822\" srcset=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20-1024x640.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20-300x188.jpg 300w, https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20-768x480.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\"\/><\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class=\"wp-caption-text gallery-caption\" id=\"gallery-1-6822\">\n\t\t\t\tFragment 20, <em><a class=\"glossaryLink\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Embodiment then takes the form of extended cognition, in which human agency and thought are enmeshed within larger networks that extend beyond the desktop computer into the environment. For this reason, models of embodied and extended cognition, such as proposed by Andy Clark (2008) and others, play a central role in my argument. (Hayles 2012, 3)&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/adapted-from-hayles-passage-16\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">adapted from Hayles passage 16<\/a><\/em>\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><br style=\"clear: both\"><\/div>\n\n<p>In connection with&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20.jpg\">fragment 20<\/a>,&nbsp;I&nbsp;could ask whether DAR is not a bit too fast and straightforward in following Hayles in the direction of embodied and extended cognition, as these relatively new models of cognition are, after all, still controversial and evolving (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_note-2-8en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Embodied and extended cognition are among a group of unorthodox positions within philosophy and cognitive science &amp;quot;that do not restrict cognition and the mind solely to the brain and its neuronal processes&rdquo; (Calonius 2013EN, ii). &amp;quot;Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent&rsquo;s body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing.&rdquo; &amp;quot;The thesis of extended cognition is the claim that cognitive systems themselves extend beyond the boundary of the individual organism. On this view, features of an agent&rsquo;s physical, social, and cultural environment can do more than distribute cognitive processing: they may well partially constitute that agent&rsquo;s cognitive system.&rdquo; (Wilson &amp;amp;amp; Foglia 2015EN.)&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/1-7en1\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">2.8EN1<\/a>). In addition, with my knowledge of&nbsp;<em>love.abz<\/em><em>\/(love.abz)<sup>3<\/sup><\/em>, I could question DAR&rsquo;s view that the performances as a whole and the reading and writing methods practiced in them specifically give reason to attach to the systemic models of cognition. Also, I could contend that DAR does not know these models well enough to apply them to&nbsp;<em>love.abz<\/em><em>\/(love.abz)<sup>3 <\/sup><\/em>or to assess them through the performances.<\/p>\n<p>However, instead of a symptomatic reading, in response to <a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20.jpg\">fragment 20<\/a> I will present&nbsp;a surface or interrogative reading (see <a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/frag\/12\/\">1.12<\/a>). Initially, this means that I will take the fragment as such without questioning its claims immediately. In this associative reading, I refer to another passage from Hayles (not the one that <a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20.jpg\">fragment 20<\/a> is based on), in which she discusses embodied and extended cognition by way of her pottery hobby (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_note-2-8en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;I quote the fragment in its entirety because it is so closely linked to my reading:&nbsp;&amp;quot;Drawing on my own experience with throwing pots, I typically would begin with a conscious idea: the shape to be crafted, the size, texture, glaze, etc. Wedging the clay gives other cognitions a chance to work as I absorb through my hands information about the clay&rsquo;s graininess, moisture content, chemical composition, etc., which may perhaps cause me to modify my original idea. Even more dynamic is working the clay on the wheel, a complex interaction between what I envision and what the clay has a mind to do. A successful pot emerges when these interactions become a fluid dance, with the clay and my hands coming to rest at the same moment. In this process, embodied cognitions of many kinds participate, including unconscious and nonconscious ones running throughout my body and, through the rhythmic kicking of my foot, extending into the wheel.&rdquo; (Hayles 2012, 92)&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/2-8en1-5\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">2.8EN1.5<\/a>). Using this passage as a starting point, I will explore how the concept of&nbsp;embodied cognition resonates with this research. In the latter part of my response, I deal with extended cognition in the same way.<\/p>\n<h3>Embodied Cognition<\/h3>\n<p>Hayles describes the process of making pots as a dynamic, complex interaction with the material (clay) and the tool (potter&rsquo;s wheel). Knowledge acquired through the body has a decisive role in shaping the process and outcome. As I draw a parallel between pottery and the performative writing practiced in <em>love.abz\/(love.abz)<sup>3<\/sup><\/em>, I concur with Hayles that information absorbed through the body plays an important role in both processes. In pottery, cognition is extended through the &ldquo;rhythmic kicking&rdquo; of the wheel, while in performance writing a similar extension occurs through sound: as the writer-performers speak into their microphones, cognition is extended into the writing machinery. Hayles describes how she starts off with a conscious idea of the pot she wants to make, somewhat like the writer-performer pursues a certain line or phrase&mdash;or an even larger structure such as a plot. (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_refer-fi cmtt_refer-en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Hayles, N. Katherine. 2012.&nbsp;&amp;lt;em&amp;gt;How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis.&amp;lt;\/em&amp;gt; Chicago &amp;amp;amp;&nbsp;London: The University of Chicago Press.&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/hayles-2012\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">Hayles 2012<\/a>, 92)<\/p>\n<p>Hayles describes receiving lots of information on the composition of the clay through her hands when starting to work with it, wedging it. As materials, clay and the textual mass created in the framework of a digital writing practice differ drastically from one another. Nonetheless, without doubt the writer-performers similarly absorb an abundance of information on the text-in-progress when they see it appear on the screen. In addition to the text, they see the other performers (from the corner of their eyes or when they turn, see <a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/08\/Fig-1_7_1.jpg\">fig. 2.8.1<\/a>) and the audience (at least in part). They sense the movements in the space. They hear not only the voices of the other performers, but also of the audience, the reactions to the writing process. From the cursor&rsquo;s movements on the screen, among other things, they receive information on the functioning of the system (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_note-2-8en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;When the speech recognition engine Dragon Dictate &amp;quot;tires,&rdquo; i.e. when the software or processor is overloaded,&nbsp;the cursor often begins to jump from one place to another in the text. Gratuitous letters may also appear next to the cursor.&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/1-7en2\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">2.8EN2<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>In its entirety, this bodily information undoubtedly affects how the writer-performer progresses in relation to their original idea and\/or ideas emerging during the improvisation. Machine translation and speech recognition&mdash;comparable to the potter&rsquo;s wheel in Hayles&rsquo;s account&mdash;have an even more significant role in this respect. The interaction between the writing group and the digital media is even more complex than that of the potter and potter&rsquo;s wheel.<\/p>\n<p>The charged negotiation is an encounter of many wills: that of the individual members of the writing group, of the writing group as a whole (if such has emerged in the improvisation), of the will written, i.e. coded, into the software (in so far as it enables and delimits the writing), and of the resulting text itself (if it has had time to form one). At best, the interaction between these differing wills can &ldquo;become a fluid dance&rdquo; (Hayles 2012, 92), but unlike in pottery, it rarely leads to a very coherent outcome, owing to the heightened mutability of digital text.<\/p>\n\n\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#gallery-2 {\n\t\t\t\tmargin: auto;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t#gallery-2 .gallery-item {\n\t\t\t\tfloat: left;\n\t\t\t\tmargin-top: 10px;\n\t\t\t\ttext-align: center;\n\t\t\t\twidth: 100%;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t#gallery-2 img {\n\t\t\t\tborder: 2px solid #cfcfcf;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t#gallery-2 .gallery-caption {\n\t\t\t\tmargin-left: 0;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\/* see gallery_shortcode() in wp-includes\/media.php *\/\n\t\t<\/style><div id=\"gallery-2\" class=\"gallery galleryid-8509 gallery-columns-1 gallery-size-large\"><dl class=\"gallery-item\"><dt class=\"gallery-icon landscape\">\n\t\t\t\t<img width=\"1024\" height=\"682\" src=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/02\/1-7-1-en-1024x682.jpg\" class=\"attachment-large size-large\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" aria-describedby=\"gallery-2-8684\" srcset=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/02\/1-7-1-en-1024x682.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/02\/1-7-1-en-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/02\/1-7-1-en-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/02\/1-7-1-en.jpg 1100w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\"\/><\/dt>\n\t\t\t\t<dd class=\"wp-caption-text gallery-caption\" id=\"gallery-2-8684\">\n\t\t\t\tFig. 2.8.1 <em>Writer-performers and writing machinery in <i>love.abz<\/i>. Kiasma Theater, Helsinki. Anna Maria H&auml;kkinen (left), Alexander Komlosi (middle), Leo Kirjonen (right), Otso Huopaniemi (background). Photo: Finnish National Gallery \/ Pirje Mykk&auml;nen<\/em>\n\t\t\t\t<\/dd><\/dl><br style=\"clear: both\"><\/div>\n\n<h3>Extended Cognition<\/h3>\n<p>Making use of Hayles&rsquo;s pottery description,&nbsp;above I have approached how cognition&mdash;which is commonly defined as the dimension of consciousness that acquires and processes information&mdash;could, in the context of <em>love.abz\/(love.abz)<sup>3<\/sup><\/em>, be embodied. Since, as activities, pottery and digital group writing are very different, the analogy has its problems&mdash;owing already to the very different materialities of clay and digital text. Clay is an organic substance, while digital text is a virtual object dependent on the technical system that supports it.<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, this somewhat lame analogy allows us to approach from another perspective, that of the physical performance space and its events, how bodily actors and technical systems enmesh in the model of extended cognition. According to my hypothesis, the totality of the information that the writer-performers bodily absorb during performative writing plays a &ldquo;significant causal or physically constitutive role&rdquo; in the collective cognitive processing that leads to the creation of the improvised texts. Therefore, to continue to follow the arguments that speak for bodily and extended cognition, this process is not limited to the brains and neuronal processes of the writer-performers. Instead, it is &ldquo;deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent.&rdquo; (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_refer-en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Wilson, Robert A. &amp;amp;amp; Foglia, Lucia. 2015. &amp;quot;Embodied Cognition.&rdquo;&nbsp;&amp;lt;i&amp;gt;Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy&amp;lt;\/i&amp;gt; website. Last modified 8 December 2015. Accessed 4 July 2016. Url:&nbsp;&amp;lt;a href=&amp;quot;https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/embodied-cognition\/&amp;quot; target=&amp;quot;_blank&amp;quot; rel=&amp;quot;noopener&amp;quot;&amp;gt;plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/embodied-cognition&amp;lt;\/a&amp;gt;&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/wilson-foglia-2015\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">Wilson &amp; Foglia 2015EN<\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>Bodily cognition could be thought to be of lesser significance in the writing of this thesis, as writing here takes place in a more conventional manner, sitting alone at a table and using a keyboard. However, my own experience of writing this thesis&mdash;and my experience of writing plays and other texts&mdash;suggests that information acquired through the body also informs more conventional forms of writing. Of even more relevance for writing of this kind may be extended cognition, another controversial theory of cognition, developed especially&nbsp;by Andy Clark (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_refer-fi cmtt_refer-en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Clark, Andy &amp;amp;amp; Chalmers, David J. 1998. &amp;quot;The Extended Mind.&rdquo; &amp;lt;em&amp;gt;Analysis&amp;lt;\/em&amp;gt; 58(1): 7&ndash;19.&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/clark-chalmers-1998\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">Clark &amp; Chalmers 1998<\/a>)&mdash;and alluded to by Hayles in the passage corresponding to <a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/Fragment-20.jpg\">fragment 20<\/a> (see adapted from Hayles passage 16).<\/p>\n<p>Above, I refer to how the already complex cognitive system comprising the collective cognitive processing of the human performers is extended into the writing machinery via the voices of the performers. In this manner, the voice bridges between human cognition and the broader human-technical cognition of the performance as a whole. This would seem to flesh out how &ldquo;cognitive systems themselves extend beyond the boundary of the individual organism.&rdquo; However, more exploration is needed to determine how the writer-performers&rsquo; &ldquo;physical, social, and cultural environment can do more than distribute cognitive processing&rdquo;. This is to ask, in what way&mdash;or in what sense&mdash;can the performative environment (stage performance or website) &ldquo;partially constitute [the writer-performers&rsquo;] cognitive system&rdquo;? (Wilson &amp; Foglia 2015EN)<\/p>\n<h3>Where Does Cognition Occur?<\/h3>\n<p><em>The text does not exist until the work on screen, with the digital media, begins. The work does not occur in the heads of the writer-performers, but on the screen. Therefore, the screen is, in this context, a stage.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>An adaptation of a Hayles passage illustrating expanded cognition, the above italic text is my attempt to imitate DAR. In the passage, Hayles recounts a narrative told by Andy Clark of an encounter between the influential physicist Richard Feynman and the historian Charles Weiner (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_note-2-8en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Despite its length, the passage deserves to be quoted in its entirety here:&nbsp;&amp;quot;Andy Clark illustrates [the potential to make use of objects to enable more sophisticated thoughts than would otherwise be possible] with a story about Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize&mdash;winning physicist, meeting with the historian Charles Weiner to discuss a batch of Feynman&rsquo;s original notes. Weiner remarks that the papers are &lsquo;a record of [Feynman&rsquo;s] day-to-day work,&rsquo; but Feynman disagrees. &lsquo;I actually did the work on the paper,&rsquo; he said. &lsquo;Well,&rsquo; Weiner said, &lsquo;the work was done in your head, but the record of it is still here.&rsquo; &lsquo;No, it&rsquo;s not a&nbsp;&amp;lt;em&amp;gt;record&amp;lt;\/em&amp;gt;, not really. It&rsquo;s&nbsp;&amp;lt;em&amp;gt;working&amp;lt;\/em&amp;gt;. You have to work on paper and this is the paper. Okay?&rsquo; Feynman makes clear that he did not have his ideas in advance and wrote them down. Rather, the process of writing down was an integral part of his thinking, and the paper and pencil were as much a part of his cognitive system as the neurons firing in his brain. Working from such instances, Clark develops the model of extended cognition (which he calls EXTENDED), contrasting it with a model that imagines cognition happens in the brain (which he calls BRAINBOUND). The differences between EXTENDED and BRAINBOUND are clear, with the neurological, experimental, and anecdotal evidence overwhelmingly favoring the former over the latter.&rdquo; (Hayles 2012, 93)&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/2-8en3\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">2.8EN3<\/a>).&nbsp;The two discuss some of Feynman&rsquo;s original notes, but are unable to agree on a key point: whether the notes constitute evidence of the work, i.e. documents, as Weiner suggests, or the work itself, as Feynman insists. Crucial for both Hayles and Clark seems to be Feynman&rsquo;s vehemence that the work was done on paper and not beforehand. Making the notes was thinking in itself and not the writing down of prepared ideas. Thus the notes cannot be proof of anything, they are the matter itself. (Hayles 2012, 93)<\/p>\n<p>The account does not tell whether Feynman uses tools other than pen and paper. Nonetheless, our perspective is shifted from the cerebral aspects of the work to the instruments, which acquire new meaning and status in cognition. In the extended cognition view, these tools are just as much a part of the cognitive system as the functioning of Feynman&rsquo;s brain. For Hayles, this illustrates the human potential to utilize objects to perform complex cognitive tasks that would otherwise be impossible. Clark&rsquo;s theory of EXTENDED and BRAINBOUND cognition&mdash;to follow his preferred notation&mdash;is based on such examples. (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_refer-fi cmtt_refer-en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Hayles, N. Katherine. 2012.&nbsp;&amp;lt;em&amp;gt;How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis.&amp;lt;\/em&amp;gt; Chicago &amp;amp;amp;&nbsp;London: The University of Chicago Press.&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/hayles-2012\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">Hayles 2012<\/a>, 93)<\/p>\n<p>In my adaptation, I in turn adapt the narrative by replacing paper with screen (and by extension pen with speech recognition, although I make no mention of this). In my retelling, Feynman&rsquo;s insistence is retained as if transferred to the writer-performers of the research: the text does not exist before it appears on screen. I also clearly agree with Clark&rsquo;s (and Hayles&rsquo;s) view of where cognition takes place: ultimately on the screen, that is, through the tools or in the instruments themselves&mdash;in any case in the cognitive system outside of the writer-performers&rsquo; brains.<\/p>\n<p>I do not, however, only slavishly transfer the model of extended cognition to digital writing. Instead, I make an important addition to the findings of this study: the instrument, the screen, is also a stage. It is therefore not an artifact, a piece of evidence such as Feynman&rsquo;s notes, whose ontological status can be disputed afterwards. Rather, it is a particular space in which performers perform&mdash;or more precisely, where a cognitive system whose parts the performers are, performs.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, viewed from within this performance practice, the argumentation seems to be valid. As it is performance, it is evident that the work is taking place on a stage. The stage is a prerequisite for the performance. If the work were to happen solely in the brains of the performers, the spectators would have nothing to see. It would be like a game of chess without a board and chess pieces.<\/p>\n<p>It is also accurate to say that the text is not prepared in advance. Although the performers write in relation to the machine translated scenes of my play, and although they are familiar with most of these scenes beforehand, the moment of writing itself is improvisatory: staying within the established rules, the performers are free to say anything. Thus, the work is done in a very concrete way on the screen. The interaction between the writer-performers&mdash;as well as between the writing group and the writing machinery&mdash;manifests itself on screen, resulting in turning points and instances of accompaniment (see <a href=\"http:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/frag\/19\/\">2.7<\/a>). If any part of this multi-level interaction does not work, this is immediately displayed on screen: the writing becomes jerky or comes to a halt altogether.<\/p>\n<p>In spite of the central position of the screen, the audience naturally also pays attention to the performers, as there are two stages here: in addition to the screen, the physical space, the theater space, in which the performers are bodily present. While watching the performers work, the audience also witnesses the results of their internal, brainbound cognition&mdash;in other words, how the cognitive processing of the group progresses. As the gaze of the spectator is divided in this way, it seems implausible to argue that cognition would not take place&nbsp;<em>at all<\/em>&nbsp;in the brain.<\/p>\n<p>When following the writing process, the significance of the cognitive system outside of the brain is evident, even to the extent that it is impossible to imagine the resulting text without such a system. Yet such a process that clearly involves both internal and external cognitive processing seems to question the sharp dichotomy between EXTENDED and BRAINBOUND. The insight expressed by Andy Clark and others is that cognition must be approached from a broad perspective, as a systemic phenomenon, in which cognitive tools outside the brain are incorporated into the cognitive process as its proper parts (<a class=\"glossaryLink cmtt_refer-en\" aria-describedby=\"tt\" data-cmtooltip=\"&lt;div class=glossaryItemBody&gt;Calonius, Lauri. 2013. &rdquo;It Ain&rsquo;t All in the Head&mdash;Situating Cognition to the Body and the Surrounding World&rdquo;.&nbsp;MA thesis in Theoretical Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki.&lt;\/div&gt;\" href=\"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/glossary\/calonius-2013en\/\" data-mobile-support=\"0\" data-gt-translate-attributes='[{\"attribute\":\"data-cmtooltip\", \"format\":\"html\"}]' tabindex=\"0\" role=\"link\">Calonius 2013EN<\/a>, 25).<\/p>\n<div class=\"viitteet\">\n<h5>Notes<\/h5>\n<p>2.8EN1<br>\nEmbodied and extended cognition are among a group of unorthodox positions within philosophy and cognitive science &ldquo;that do not restrict cognition and the mind solely to the brain and its neuronal processes&rdquo; (Calonius 2013EN, ii). &ldquo;Cognition is embodied when it is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent, that is, when aspects of the agent&rsquo;s body beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing.&rdquo; &ldquo;The thesis of extended cognition is the claim that cognitive systems themselves extend beyond the boundary of the individual organism. On this view, features of an agent&rsquo;s physical, social, and cultural environment can do more than distribute cognitive processing: they may well partially constitute that agent&rsquo;s cognitive system.&rdquo; (Wilson &amp; Foglia 2015EN.)<\/p>\n<p>2.8EN1.5<br>\nI quote the fragment in its entirety because it is so closely linked to my reading:&nbsp;&ldquo;Drawing on my own experience with throwing pots, I typically would begin with a conscious idea: the shape to be crafted, the size, texture, glaze, etc. Wedging the clay gives other cognitions a chance to work as I absorb through my hands information about the clay&rsquo;s graininess, moisture content, chemical composition, etc., which may perhaps cause me to modify my original idea. Even more dynamic is working the clay on the wheel, a complex interaction between what I envision and what the clay has a mind to do. A successful pot emerges when these interactions become a fluid dance, with the clay and my hands coming to rest at the same moment. In this process, embodied cognitions of many kinds participate, including unconscious and nonconscious ones running throughout my body and, through the rhythmic kicking of my foot, extending into the wheel.&rdquo; (Hayles 2012, 92)<\/p>\n<p>2.8EN2<br>\nWhen the speech recognition engine Dragon Dictate &ldquo;tires,&rdquo; i.e. when the software or processor is overloaded,&nbsp;the cursor often begins to jump from one place to another in the text. Gratuitous letters may also appear next to the cursor.<\/p>\n<p>2.8EN3<br>\nDespite its length, the passage deserves to be quoted in its entirety here:&nbsp;&ldquo;Andy Clark illustrates [the potential to make use of objects to enable more sophisticated thoughts than would otherwise be possible] with a story about Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize&mdash;winning physicist, meeting with the historian Charles Weiner to discuss a batch of Feynman&rsquo;s original notes. Weiner remarks that the papers are &lsquo;a record of [Feynman&rsquo;s] day-to-day work,&rsquo; but Feynman disagrees. &lsquo;I actually did the work on the paper,&rsquo; he said. &lsquo;Well,&rsquo; Weiner said, &lsquo;the work was done in your head, but the record of it is still here.&rsquo; &lsquo;No, it&rsquo;s not a&nbsp;<em>record<\/em>, not really. It&rsquo;s&nbsp;<em>working<\/em>. You have to work on paper and this is the paper. Okay?&rsquo; Feynman makes clear that he did not have his ideas in advance and wrote them down. Rather, the process of writing down was an integral part of his thinking, and the paper and pencil were as much a part of his cognitive system as the neurons firing in his brain. Working from such instances, Clark develops the model of extended cognition (which he calls EXTENDED), contrasting it with a model that imagines cognition happens in the brain (which he calls BRAINBOUND). The differences between EXTENDED and BRAINBOUND are clear, with the neurological, experimental, and anecdotal evidence overwhelmingly favoring the former over the latter.&rdquo; (Hayles 2012, 93)<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>2.8 Fragment 20 In connection with\u00a0fragment 20,\u00a0I\u00a0could ask whether DAR is not a bit too fast and straightforward in following Hayles in the direction of embodied and extended cognition, as these relatively new models of cognition are, after all, still controversial and evolving (2.8EN1). In addition, with my knowledge of\u00a0love.abz\/(love.abz)3, I could question DAR\u2019s view [&#8230;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[30],"tags":[],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8509"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8509"}],"version-history":[{"count":18,"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8509\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":20490,"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8509\/revisions\/20490"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8509"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8509"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/actascenica.teak.fi\/huopaniemi-otso\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8509"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}